Module 20 — Phases 25-39: E2E Security Spot-Check, Perf/UX/SEO, Support Docs, Final Checklist, TODO Sweep, Git Audit
A confirmation sweep, not a rebuild: Modules 16-19 and this module's own Phase 5 (dedicated security audit) and Phases 6-24 already covered auth/authz/SSRF/IDOR/prompt-injection/rate-limiting/file-upload/webhook/ tenant-isolation security, pagination/N+1/index performance, and SDK/CLI/ mobile/desktop reliability in dedicated passes. This phase's job was to confirm none of that has regressed and to close out the remaining Module-20-spec checklist items (TODO sweep, git audit, SEO, support docs, launch checklist), not to re-run those audits from scratch.
TODO/FIXME/HACK/XXX sweep
Nothing found. A repo-wide grep across apps/, packages/, sdks/,
extensions/ for TODO|FIXME|HACK|XXX returned only false positives:
the HACKERONE bug-bounty-platform enum value (appears in DTOs and web
pages) and one XXXX placeholder inside a license-key format string
(PHUB-ENT-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX) in packages/shared/src/infrastructure.ts.
No actual unresolved work-item comment exists anywhere in the codebase —
consistent with this project's stated convention of writing disclosed
gaps into docs/reviews//doc comments rather than leaving inline TODOs.
Git audit
Clean. git status --short empty at the time of the check. Recent
history (git log --oneline -20) shows a coherent Module 19 → Module 20
progression ending at the Phase 22-24 commit. git diff --stat HEAD~15
shows a diff entirely explained by this module's own documented phases
— no stray or unexplained changes.
SEO basics (apps/web)
No robots.txt, no sitemap, and no per-page metadata export beyond
the site-wide title/description in app/layout.tsx. Not treated as a
gap: apps/web has no public marketing surface — every route lives
under the (auth) or (dashboard) route groups, including /pricing,
which is itself behind the authenticated dashboard layout. SEO
infrastructure (sitemaps, per-page metadata, indexability) exists to
help search engines rank pages the public can browse; this app has none
to offer them. Building SEO scaffolding for pages that require login
would be effort spent on a non-problem. Documented here explicitly so a
future reader doesn't mistake "no SEO setup" for "no SEO audit was
done."
Support docs
docs/architecture/support-system.md re-checked against the running
code: POST /support/tickets (public, rate-limited) and
GET /support/tickets/mine (authenticated) both exist exactly as
described, and the referenced diagnostics-hook integration
(apps/web/features/system/hooks/use-diagnostics.ts) is real. No drift
found; no edit needed.
Final checklist
No dedicated "launch checklist" document exists in docs/releases/ or
docs/operations/ today — only per-module release-notes files and this
module's own docs/reviews/ write-ups, which are narrative rather than
a checkbox list. Deliberately not created here: Module 20's own
closure phase (Phase 40-45) already calls for a "final release status"
and "project closure document," which is the natural home for a
checklist covering this entire module's work — creating a separate,
overlapping checklist document now would fragment that final summary
across two files instead of one. Noted as a forward pointer, not a gap
left unaddressed.
E2E security spot-check (guard presence, not a new audit)
Confirmed three representative, recently-touched surfaces still sit behind the expected guard chain:
POST /extensions/:id/invoke— no@Public(); the handler's own doc comment confirmsExtensionPermissionEnforcer.assertAuthorized()runs before any outbound call, plus a tighter route-level@Throttle.- Recon/vuln job creation (
POST targets/:targetId/recon/jobs,.../vuln/scan-jobs, the two handlers Phase 8 added quota enforcement to) — no@Public(); workspace/target scoping delegated to the command handlers as established since Module 3/4. - Public API keys (
list/create/revoke/rotate, the surfaces Phase 16 gave SDK/CLI coverage to) — no@Public().
All three sit under the global guard chain registered in
apps/api/src/app.module.ts (ThrottlerGuard, IpAllowlistGuard,
MtlsGuard, JwtAuthGuard, RolesGuard, EditionGuard as APP_GUARD
providers) — the same "secure by default unless explicitly @Public()"
posture confirmed in every prior module's security review. No gap found.
Verification
This phase's own verification is the sweep described above: a repo-wide grep for unresolved work markers, a git-history/status check, a code-vs-doc cross-check for the one support-docs claim, and a guard-decorator presence check on three representative controllers. No source file was edited this phase — every item resolved to "already correct" or "not applicable to this app's shape," so there was nothing to fix.